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CAN ARMED DRONES HALT THE TREND OF
INCREASING POLICE MILITARIZATION?
IAN THRESHER*
ABSTRACT
Following presidential declarations of “war” on drugs and terror, domestic
law enforcement agencies were saddled with difficult and dangerous new
duties. They responded to the danger by becoming more dangerous them-
selves; increasingly adopting the training, tactics, and equipment of the
United States military. This “militarization” of domestic police officers has,
predictably, led to a breakdown in community policing, almost one thou-
sand fatal shootings by police officers per year, and growing rifts between
law enforcement agencies and the communities they are sworn to protect. In
this essay, I examine whether police drones armed with non-deadly force
might, perhaps paradoxically, help to curb police militarization and reduce
the risk of direct, armed confrontation between civilians and police officers.
I argue that while there are some drawbacks with the use of armed drones,
their unique ability to keep police officers out of harm’s way, thereby negat-
ing the legal justification for the use of deadly force, would halt the need for
further police militarization and dramatically reduce the number of fatal
police shootings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you are walking down a street, turn the corner, and
see an armored vehicle lumbering towards you. Suppose further that
you can see men on the top of the armored vehicle, but you cannot
make out their faces because they are wearing gas masks and helmets.
Their bulletproof vests, which partially cover their camouflage
uniforms, give them a bulky appearance, and you can see, as the vehicle
comes closer, that all of the men are carrying either shotguns or assault
rifles.  Now imagine that you see another, similar vehicle a little further
away. The men on this vehicle are dressed and armed in exactly the
same manner.  Without any kind of landmarks to go by, where do you
suppose you would be?  You might be correct in believing that you are
in Syria or Iraq, or perhaps in another part of the Middle East, but you
would also be correct if you thought yourself in Middle America.
Following the death of Michael Brown on August 9th, 2014, this
scene is precisely what greeted the citizens, visitors, and media in Fergu-
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son, Missouri.1  But it was not just the equipment and uniforms them-
selves that were shocking.  Equally troubling was the “us versus them”
attitude that the police officers, no doubt themselves scared, exhib-
ited.2  The violence and destruction that ensued was both predictable
and lamentable.  The riots caused approximately $4.6 million in prop-
erty damage3 and resulted in hundreds of arrests.4  News media
reported extensively on the military-esque behavior and equipment of
the St. Louis area police departments.  Paul Szoldra, a former U.S.
Marine turned Business Insider reporter, wrote, “In Afghanistan, we
patrolled in big, armored trucks.  We wore uniforms that conveyed the
message, ‘We are a military force, and we are in control right now.’
Many Afghans saw us as occupiers. And now we see some of our police
officers in this same way.”5
President Obama responded to the outcry by calling for a review of
the distribution of federal equipment to state and local law enforce-
ment agencies.6  Instead of effecting real change in federal programs
that disperse this equipment, however, the review encouraged better
training for officers and better data on where the equipment went.7
Exactly how this was supposed to quell society’s fears that local police
officers are looking and behaving increasingly like soldiers in a hostile
land is unclear.  What is clear is that Americans have long known of the
danger posed by militarized police, even if that knowledge appears to
be periodically forgotten.
Between 1768 and 1770, British soldiers occupied Boston in order
to enforce “regulations and taxes intended to demonstrate British con-
trol over the colony.”8  These regulations and taxes were deeply unpop-
ular, and the presence of the British soldiers, who were there, like
modern day police officers, to enforce the law, led to tensions on both
sides.  These tensions exploded on March 5, 1770, when a Boston mob
formed around Private Hugh White, a British soldier on sentry duty,
1. Niraj Chokshi, Militarized Police in Ferguson Unsettles Some; Pentagon Gives Cities
Equipment, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mili
tarized-police-in-ferguson-unsettles-some-pentagon-gives-cities-equipment/2014/08/14/
4651f670-2401-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html.
2. In a confrontation between protestors and police officers caught on video by
CNN, a police officer can be heard saying, “Bring it, all you fucking animals. Bring
it!”Ferguson Cop to Protesters “Bring it, all you fucking animals! Bring it!”,YOUTUBE (Aug. 13,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WUF-VPAnvE0.
3. Ben Unglesbee, Buildings Destroyed in Ferguson Riots Worth Millions, ST. LOUIS BUS.
J. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2014/12/04/buildings-
destroyed-in-ferguson-riots-worth.html.
4. Ellen Wulfhorst et al., More than 400 Arrested as Ferguson Protests Spread to Other U.S.
Cities, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-missouri-shooting
-idUSKCN0J80PR20141126.
5. Paul Szoldra, This is the Terrifying Result of the Militarization of Police, BUS. INSIDER
(Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/police-militarization-ferguson-2014-8.
6. Evan Perez, Police Militarization: The Ferguson Issue that Wasn’t, CNN (Dec. 1,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/01/politics/ferguson-police-militarization-white-
house/.
7. Id.
8. Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law
Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 389–90 (2003).
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and began to threaten him and throw objects at him.  After he called
for assistance, eight more British troops arrived.  These soldiers, sur-
rounded by a boisterous crowd and confronted by a chaotic situation,
fired into the crowd.  The event would come to be known as the Boston
Massacre.9  Only two of the British soldiers were convicted of a crime,
and they were convicted of manslaughter instead of murder because,
the jury found, the soldiers reasonably feared for their lives.  Just five years
after this incident, Thomas Jefferson would include, as one of the colo-
nists’ grievances against King George, that the king had “quarter[ed]
large bodies of armed troops among us.”10  The Framers of the Consti-
tution thought that the risks posed by quartering “armed troops” with
civilians was so great that they banned the practice in the Third Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution.11
The Framers knew more than two hundred years ago what Ameri-
can society is being forced to re-learn today: law enforcement officers
who are equipped and trained as a military force endanger the societies
that they are tasked to protect.  The Boston Massacre occurred because
the soldiers felt threatened by the assembling Boston mob.  The assem-
bling mob, in turn, gathered because of the presence of the troops and
their temperament towards the colonists.  The causes and effects of
police militarization are, therefore, a kind of self-reinforcing loop.
Today, as in 1770, police militarization alienates the public and leaves
its members distrustful of the officers’ motivations and purpose.
Instead of protecting the public, the paramilitary forces appear to be
subduing it, and this leads to the same tensions that erupted in Boston
more than two centuries ago.  As long as confrontations exist between
armed law enforcement officers and the public, and the officers per-
ceive themselves to be in danger, there exists the threat of deadly force.
The reason lies in the use of force standards that constitutionally
bind law enforcement agencies.  In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme
Court established the standard for an excessive force claim.12  The
Court ruled that, in assessing whether the use of deadly force was justi-
fied, the “question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively rea-
sonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”13  Objective
reasonableness “requires careful attention to the facts and circum-
stances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.”14
9. Id.
10. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 16 (U.S. 1776).
11. The Third Amendment states, “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered
in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.”U.S. CONST. amend. III.
12. Graham analyzed “excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investiga-
tory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of [a] person.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
13. Id. at 397.
14. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
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An analysis of fatal shootings by police reveals that the vast majority
of such shootings occur when the police officers themselves feel
threatened.  According to a Washington Post database tracking fatal
shootings, 991 people were killed by police officers in 2015.15  Of those
991 people killed, 844 of them were killed because the officer perceived
them to be a threat.16  In only forty-two cases did the police officer
shoot in order to protect another person who was in danger.17  In the
remaining 102 fatal shootings, it is unclear whether the police shot out
of concern for their safety or for the safety of the public.18  Regardless,
the overwhelming majority of shootings occur because a police officer
feels that his or her life is in danger.
These deadly confrontations will only continue with increased
police militarization.  Professor Cynthia Brown writes that the “expan-
sion of militarization in America, particularly including normalizing the
use of military-style tactics in mainstream police functions, undergirded
by the theory of just war, is largely responsible for increases in unethical
decision-making by police officers.”19  Increasingly, officers derive their
“appearance, tactics, operations, weaponry, and culture” from military
units.20  When combined with the increased burdens that society has
placed on law enforcement agencies,21 police officers are undertaking
more dangerous operations and are more confrontational with sus-
pects.22  This, predictably, leads to more fatal police shootings and the
attendant civilian unrest.
With this in mind, the announcement last August that police
officers in North Dakota are legally permitted to use armed drones
would seem to be a dangerous new development in the ongoing march
of police militarization.23  Indeed, a Reason-Rupe Poll found that 58% of
15. Washington Post Database, 991 People  Shot Dead by Police in 2015, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/.
16. Author’s analysis from the description accompanying each shooting in the
Washington Post database.
17. Id.
18. Id. Also included are accidental shootings.
19. Cynthia A. Brown, Divided Loyalties: Ethical Challenges for America’s Law Enforce-
ment in Post 9/11 America, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 651, 652–53 (2011).
20. Id. at 673.
21. Cadman R. Kiker, From Mayberry to Ferguson: The Militarization of American Policing
Equipment, Culture, and Mission, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 282, 285 (2014) (discuss-
ing how politicians have propagated “wars” on crime, drugs, and terrorism, and local law
enforcement agencies are on the frontlines).
22. Kealy, supra note 8, at 421.
23. The North Dakota State Legislature passed House Bill 1328 on August 27, 2015,
a little more than one year after the events in Ferguson. Laura Wagner, North Dakota
Legalizes Armed Police Drones, NPR (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/08/27/435301160/north-dakota-legalizes-armed-police-drones.  At the time,
one commentator derisively asserted that the bill was only passed because of a “pro-police
lobbyist.” Justin Glawe, First State Legalizes Taser Drones for Cops, Thanks to a Lobbyist, DAILY
BEAST (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/26/first-state-
legalizes-armed-drones-for-cops-thanks-to-a-lobbyist.html.
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Americans believe that police use of drones “goes too far.”24  Although
this sentiment, expressed by several commentators,25 is tempting, it
ignores the fundamental changes and promise that drones represent.
Nowhere are these changes more apparent or important than in their
impact on the use of force by police officers.
This Note will explore the negative aspects of using armed drones,
but within the context of police militarization, I argue that drones,
along with other new technologies,26 have the potential to drastically
reduce the number of incidents of police violence and, in turn, halt the
need for further police militarization.  The reason lies in the nature of
a drone.  Unlike an officer at the scene, a drone operator is not himself
at any risk, and a drone armed with non-lethal armaments would not be
justified in, or capable of, using deadly force.  Although armed drones
could obviously not replace police officers, I contend that drones would
reduce the risk to officers by reducing the instances of confrontation.
This, in turn, is one way of both preventing fatal police shootings and
halting the perceived need of further police militarization.
This Note is divided into five sections.  Section two takes a greater
look at the problems and causes of police militarization.  It discusses
the riots in Baltimore and contrasts the lack of police action there with
Ferguson.  It then explains how and why police are becoming more mil-
itarized.  The next part focuses on drone technology and clarifies what
an armed police drone would actually look like.  Section four analyzes
the impact that drones will have on use of force guidelines and how this
will serve the public good.  I also consider various objections  to police
use of armed drones, and the danger that they will reinforce rather
than limit the perception of police militarization.  I conclude by offer-
ing ways that a lobby group might have success in changing the public’s
attitude towards armed drones.
II. POLICE MILITARIZATION AND CONFRONTATION
The protests that consumed Ferguson, Missouri, for a week in
August 2014 had a profound impact on the way that police and civilians
responded to fatal shootings and social unrest.  On the one hand, there
was widespread outrage at the behavior and appearance of the police
officers in Ferguson.  The officers resembled more of an occupying
force than a community-funded agency tasked with providing “protec-
24. Emily Ekins, 58 Percent Say Police Departments Using Drones, Military Weapons Goes
Too Far, 60 Percent of Tea Partiers Agree, REASON-RUPE POLL (Dec. 17, 2013), https://reason
.com/poll/2013/12/17/56-percent-say-police-departments-usin2.
25. See, Glawe, supra note 23.
26. Body cameras are one of the most promising new tools in combating police
violence and social unrest. The cameras operate as ex ante restraints on a police officer’s
use of force because the officer knows that everything is being filmed and will therefore
be prevented from testifying to facts that put him in a more flattering light. Additionally,
the cameras will reduce social unrest following the shooting death of a civilian because
the cameras will be able to show how the situation unfolded from the police officer’s
point of view. Although it will not placate everyone, the videotape should help to avoid
massive social disruption of the kind seen in Ferguson and elsewhere in those situations
where the shooting is justified.
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tion of life and property in Ferguson through the enforcement of laws
and ordinances and assistance with emergency medical services.”27  On
the other hand, the militarized police, intimidating as they were, never
used lethal force against any of the protestors.  This meant that milita-
rized police could, potentially, have been for the greater good because
they effectively acted as a deterrent to violent conduct.  The uncertainty
surrounding whether or not heavily armed police benefitted or harmed
society, an issue first raised at Ferguson, would come to plague officials
less than one year later in Baltimore.
On April 12, 2015, Freddie Gray was arrested by Baltimore police
and taken to a police station.  By the time he arrived, he was unable to
breathe or talk.28  While in transit, Freddie Gray suffered a spinal cord
injury that put him into a coma and resulted in his death one week
later, on April 19th.29  By April 25th, protests over his death at the
hands of police began to turn violent.30  Protestors broke a storefront
window, threw rocks, and damaged police cruisers.  Officers in riot gear
broke up fights and made several arrests outside of Camden yards.31
But these isolated outbreaks of violence soon gave way to one of the
most destructive riots that America has faced in the 21st century.  Fol-
lowing Freddie Gray’s funeral on April 27th, Baltimore quickly
descended into a “war zone.”32  Residents threw bottles, rocks, and
chunks of concrete at officers in riot gear, injuring fifteen, and set fire
to cars and looted buildings.33  The total destruction amounted to
around $9 million in damage and largely involved businesses that had
limited or no insurance coverage.34
The following day, the conundrum of Ferguson became apparent.
On April 25th, the same day the protests initially turned violent, Balti-
more Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake said, “[w]hile we tried to make
sure that (protestors) were protected from the cars and the other
things that were going on, we also gave those who wished to destroy
27. CITY OF FERGUSON: POLICE DEPARTMENT, https://www.fergusoncity.com/92/
Police-Department (last visited Sep. 26, 2016).
28. David A. Graham, The Mysterious Death of Freddie Gray, ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-mysterious-death-of-freddie-
gray/391119/.
29. Id.
30. Sheryl G. Stolberg & Stephen Babcock, Scenes of Chaos in Baltimore as Thousands
Protest Freddie Gray’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
04/26/us/baltimore-crowd-swells-in-protest-of-freddie-grays-death.html?_r=0.
31. Id.
32. Dana Ford & Holly Yan , Baltimore Riots: Looting, Fires Engulf City After Freddie
Gray’s Funeral, CNN (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/27/us/baltimore-
unrest/.
33. Sheryl G. Stolberg, Baltimore Enlists National Guard and a Curfew to Fight Riots and
Looting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/us/baltimore-
freddie-gray.html.
34. Yvonne Wenger, Damage to Businesses from Baltimore Rioting Estimated at about $9
million, WASH. POST (May 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/damage-to-
businesses-from-baltimore-rioting-estimated-at-9-million/2015/05/13/5848c3fe-f9a8-11e4
-a13c-193b1241d51a_story.html.
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space to do that as well.”35  This was seen by many, including Balti-
more’s representative in the Maryland House of Delegates and a Balti-
more City Councilman, to be a license to the protestors to cause trouble
and a warning to police not to respond aggressively.36  This was fol-
lowed by claims from unnamed law enforcement officers who said that
there was a direct order, despite Mayor Rawlings-Blake’s insistences oth-
erwise, to stand down even as the riots broke out.37
Regardless of whether or not Mayor Rawlings-Blake issued such an
order to law enforcement,38 the specter of Ferguson can be seen in the
official response.  With the growth of police militarization and the envi-
ronment in which riot officers are often employed, public officials after
Ferguson face a Hobson’s choice.  They can either deploy police
officers armed in full military gear and take the risk of violent confron-
tation and further alienation of the community, or they can take a more
hands off approach, assuring that officers are not put in an overly dan-
gerous environment but risking additional damage and civilian-on-civil-
ian violence.  The riots in Ferguson and Baltimore represent the two
extremes and show the dangers of each.  The answer to police militari-
zation is, therefore, not to strip officers of all of their tools and force
them to totally abandon their duties in the face of growing violence.
But, as Ferguson and other experiences show, nor is the answer to fur-
ther militarize the police,39 which appears to be the ongoing trend and
holds just as great a risk to society as officers who sit on the sidelines.
In order to understand how police militarization emerged, it is
important to understand what the term means.  “Militarization is the
process of institutionalizing ‘a set of beliefs and values that stress the
use of force and domination as appropriate means to solve problems
35. Josh Levs, Baltimore’s Handling of Riots Slammed as ‘Disaster’, CNN (Apr. 28, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/28/us/baltimore-riots-authorities/.
36. Id. (when asked whether she thought Mayor Rawlings-Blake was calling for
police to hold back, Delegate Jill Carter replied, “[a]bsolutely,” and said that police acted
“completely opposite to their normal behavior” of being “super aggressive”).
37. Leland Vittert, Source: Baltimore Mayor Ordered Police to Stand Down, FOX NEWS
(Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/04/29/source-baltimore-mayor-
ordered-police-to-stand-down.html.
38. For an argument that the police in Baltimore may have responded over-aggres-
sively and, in fact, partially caused the protests to become as violent and destructive as
they did See Sam Brodey& Jenna McLaughlin, Eyewitnesses: The Baltimore Riots Didn’t Start
the Way You Think, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/polit-
ics/2015/04/how-baltimore-riots-began-mondawmin-purge (arguing that by shutting
down bus routes, train stops, and keeping students from returning home immediately
after school, Baltimore police actually made the rioting more likely and pervasive).
39. Despite their relatively passive response to rioters on April 27th, 2015, and offi-
cial concerns over further militarizing the police force in Baltimore, by May 2015, Balti-
more law enforcement had sought and received rifles, shotguns, sights, and even a
bayonet as part of the Federal Government’s 1033 Program. See Baltimore Receipts of Polic-
ing Equipment from U.S. Military Under the 1033 Program, BALTIMORE SUN (May 20, 2015),
http://data.baltimoresun.com/from-cms/equipment-data/ (stating that despite their rel-
atively passive response to rioters on April 27th, 2015, and official concerns over further
militarizing the police force in Baltimore, by May 2015, Baltimore law enforcement had
sought and received rifles, shotguns, sights, and even a bayonet as part of the Federal
Government’s 1033 Program).
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and gain political power, while glorifying the tools to accomplish this—
military power, hardware, and technology.’”40  The militarization of law
enforcement began largely as a result of the war on drugs in the 1980s,
but accelerated after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.41  “The
concept of the ‘warrior cop’” emerged “as a response to the various
‘wars’ propagated by numerous politicians.  There have been ‘wars’ on
crime, drugs, and . . . terrorism.”42  Terming these threats as “wars”
marked an important turning point in law enforcement culture.  While
nobody expressly stated who was on the other side of these wars, the
implication is that someone must have been.  This changes the psychol-
ogy from working to protect the public to being inherently suspicious
of the public.  The changing expectations for the police, and the corro-
sive effects that this had on the community, can be called “mission
creep.”
“Mission creep” occurs when an independent agency is motivated
or forced by external agents to change its purpose and conduct.  After
9/11, the federal government tasked every law enforcement agency
with being a part of the global “War on Terror.”43  This new task came
at a time when law enforcement agencies were already beginning to use
SWAT teams for even routine purposes.44  Nonetheless, the specter of a
new “war” resulted in a changing approach and new military equip-
ment, which “encourages police officers to focus on the warlike aspects
of policing—aggressive crime fighting—and in turn leads to a ‘warlike’
approach to law enforcement.”45  The result of this mission creep is
predictable.  It has resulted in increased deployment of SWAT teams for
routine police activities and even led to non-violent offenders being
subjected to violent assaults in their own homes.46  As Sean Kealy suc-
cinctly writes, “[t]his ‘mission creep’ has led to the police looking and
acting more like troops.”47  This aggressive policing approach, in turn,
puts officers in harm’s way and increases the likelihood of confronta-
40. Bethany J. Peak, Militarization of School Police: One Route on the School-to-Prison Pipe-
line, 68 ARK. L. REV. 195,196 (2015-16) (citing Peter B. Kraska& Victor E. Kappeler, Milita-
rizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. PROBS. 1
(1997)).
41. Brown, supra note 19, at 652–53, 675.
42. Kiker, supra note 21, at 285.
43. Id. at 287.
44. Peak,supra note 40, at 204. As early as 1995, almost 94% of all SWAT teams were
being used to serve warrants, usually no-knock raids on private residences.
45. Id. at 205.
46. Jeffrey A. Endebak, More Bang for Their Buck: How Federal Dollars are Militarizing
American Law Enforcement, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1479, 1498 (2013-14).
47. Kealy, supra note 8, at 432. The irony of this statement is that federal law pro-
hibits any person from “willfully us[ing] any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse
comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws. . .” (18 U.S.C. § 1385). The statute essentially
prohibits the Army and Air Force (though not the Navy) from aiding in law enforcement
functions. This is why the National Guard, and not the Army, is often called in to respond
to rioters. The issue is that modern SWAT teams are virtually indistinguishable from
troops. So, while the letter of the Act is not violated by the growing use of SWAT teams
and militarized police because those are still ostensibly members of law enforcement,
such actions almost certainly violate the spirit of the Act.
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tion.48  In response to more confrontations, police officers become
more militarized in their conduct and equipment.49  This system, there-
fore, creates a self-reinforcing loop that simply increases tensions
between police officers and the community they are supposed to serve.
Nonetheless, this warlike approach to policing would be largely tooth-
less if it were not for the fact that law enforcement officers receive the
equipment to back it up.
In response to the “War on Drugs,” the Department of Defense
created the “1033 Program,” which transferred “excess military prop-
erty to state and local law enforcement agencies.”50  The program was
scaled up significantly following the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks when it was determined that police officers lacked the equip-
ment to combat a terrorist force.51  A 2014 study conducted by NPR
analyzed every military item sent to local, state and federal agencies
from 2006 until April 23, 2014.  The study found that during that time,
the 1033 Program sent more than 600 mine-resistant, ambush-pro-
tected vehicles (MRAPs) to local law enforcement agencies.52  It also
supplied law enforcement officers with 79,288 assault rifles, 205 gre-
nade launchers, 11,959 bayonets, $3.6 million worth of camouflage
gear, and a whopping $124 million worth of night-vision equipment,
including sniper scopes.53  Where do local law enforcement communi-
ties get the money to buy military surplus equipment from the federal
government?  Oddly enough, from the federal government.  Since the
9/11 terrorist attacks, the Department of Homeland security has given
out $34 billion in grants to state and local law enforcement, resulting in
what one scholar called a “gear-buying spree.”54
The mere acquisition of this equipment is problematic because, as
Bethany Peak has noted, “military weapons have symbolic value in soci-
ety.”55  Thus, even though rarely deployed, the fact that police depart-
ments request MRAPs, grenade launchers, and bayonets is a troubling
fact in and of itself.  One could fathom why police officers might need
assault rifles, but it is difficult to envision a scenario in which society
would ever want or expect law enforcement officers to confront Ameri-
can citizens while riding on top of an MRAP with bayonets fixed.  The
1033 Program and other federal initiatives provide the necessary funds
and equipment for the creation and proliferation of “paramilitary units
48. Peak,supra note 40, at 205.
49. Brown, supra note 19, at 652–53.
50. Peak,supra note 40, at 199-200.
51. Kiker, supra note 21, at 287.
52. Arezou Rezvani et al., MRAPs and Bayonets: What We Know About the Pentagon’s
1033 Program, NPR (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/02/342494225/mraps-
and-bayonets-what-we-know-about-the-pentagons-1033-program (Los Angeles County
alone has nine of these vehicles).
53. Id.
54. Endebak, supra note 46, at 1490.
55. Peak,supra note 40, at 206.
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that utilize military training and tactics.”56  This, in turn, instills the
“warrior mentality” that threatens local communities.57
All of this new military equipment, with its attendant dangers,
raises a simple question.  Why?  Why is the federal government spend-
ing billions of dollars on equipment that is rarely used and, when it is,
increases hostility and distrust towards the police officers?  Is there
really a problem that needs to be “solved?”  This question is taken up
within the context of school police by Bethany Peak in her article, Mili-
tarization of School Police: One Route to the School-to-Prison Pipeline.58  Peak
points out that if New York City’s public school safety division was a
local police force, it would be the 5th largest police force in the coun-
try, and that many school systems now possess their “own military-grade
weapons and equipment.”59  She traces the rise of police in schools to
fears over school shootings and crime, both of which are legitimate
fears, but likely overblown.60 She says,
Today, society blurs the concepts of an unsafe learning environ-
ment and distractions caused by behavioral problems. Much of the pun-
ishment and disciplinary actions imposed upon students do not result
from violent behavior, such as physically harming a teacher or another
student, but rather from behavior disruptive to the learning
environment.61
School police are, in short, being used to solve a problem that does
not need to be solved. At least, not solved by them.
The same could be said of militarized police in general.  One argu-
ment for militarized police might be that it is better to have them and
not need them, than to need them and not have them.  But this argu-
ment rests on the assumption that these paramilitary units are, in fact,
needed.  Put another way, is the threat for which militarized police are
supposed to be combating akin to the perceived threat of violence in
schools?  Taking the threat of terrorist attacks as the impetus for cur-
rent police militarization,62 an analysis of the casualties of terrorist
attacks in the United States reveals that the risk posed is actually quite
small, at least at the community level that state police departments
operate.  In the fifteen years since 9/11, ninety-four people have been
killed by violent jihadist attacks, and another forty-eight have been
killed by right wing terrorists.63  By comparison, 987 people were fatally
56. Endebak, supra note 46, at 1494.
57. Id.
58. See Peak, supra note 40.
59. Id. at 196.
60. Id. at 213. Peak states that several studies have shown that schools have gotten
safer over the last few decades and that students are twice as likely to be victims of a crime
outside of schools as they are inside.
61. Id.
62. See Kiker, supra note 21, at 287 (following the 9/11 attacks, “[s]uddenly, the
federal government tasked every law enforcement agency in the United States—no mat-
ter the size—with being part of the ‘global war on terrorism.’”).
63. Deadly Attacks Since 9/11, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, http://securitydata.new
america.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html.
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shot by American law enforcement in 2015 alone.64  If we are prepared
to see a link between police militarization and increased confrontation
and violence,65 as I have argued, then it is possible that fears about
terrorist attacks at the local level may be doing more harm than good.
That is, as police gain access to equipment and training designed to
combat a terrorist attack, they are similarly gaining access to equipment
and training that they use during routine police work.  As long as the
threat of terrorist attacks continues to exercise an inordinate amount of
control over citizens and the government, the march towards police
militarization to combat this “threat” will continue, and the statistics
show that this policy causes society’s very protectors to simultaneously
be one of its biggest threats.
III. POLICE DRONES: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY ARE NOT
For the purposes of this Note, the word “drone” means “a powered,
aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic
forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted
remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or
nonlethal payload.”66  Drones may perform a host of different func-
tions, some of which are discussed below, but the focus will be on
drones armed with non-lethal (pepper spray, taser, or bean bag gun)
armaments.
It may also be helpful to explain what an armed police drone actu-
ally looks like.  The armed drones that police operate are very different
from the Predator drones that the United States military uses in its
counter-terrorism operations.  Using the ShadowHawk drone as a typi-
cal example of the type used by law enforcement, a police drone is sig-
nificantly smaller, less complicated, and has a relatively limited range
and operation time.67  The ShadowHawk looks like a miniature heli-
copter, can fly for up to three hours at a time, and operates via mobile
computer control.68  The drone itself (without any additional equip-
ment) weighs forty-nine pounds and is seven feet long.69  Although it is
marketed on its website as being able to carry high-intensity cameras,70
64. WASH. POST, supra note 15.
65. See also Peak, supra note 40, at 205; Brown, supra note 19, at 670; Endebak, supra
note 46, at 1494; Kealy, supra note 8, at 421.
66. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (DRONES) AND LAW 2 (Lydia de Beer ed., 2011).
67. See Heather Alexander, $250k Police Drones Crashes into Lake Conroe, CHRON (Apr.
30, 2014), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/woodlands/article/250K-police-drone-
crashes-into-Lake-Conroe-5435343.php. The Montgomery Police Department in Texas
was one of the first police departments to buy a ShadowHawk drone. It was able to afford
the $250,000 drone courtesy of a federal grant. Unfortunately, the drone was lost during a
training exercise when it malfunctioned and crashed into a lake.
68. Vanguard’s Unmanned Applications, VANGUARD DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, http://un
manned.wix.com/vanguarddefense#!applications/galleryPage.
69. ShadowHawk Unmanned Aerial System, VANGUARD DEF. INDUS., http://media.wix.
com/ugd/709bcc_afcf73d27be44c7e82d0029f04743c11.pdf.
70. See Vanguard’s Unmanned Applications, supra note 68 (describing that the
ShadowHawk can carry an electro-optical camera with 32x zoom capabilities as well as a
Forward Looking Infrared Camera for nighttime operations).
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some models are capable of carrying shotguns and grenade launchers
in addition to less lethal armaments.71  At the moment, ShadowHawk
drones are primarily used for their surveillance and recording capabili-
ties.72  Compare this to the United States Air Force’s MQ-1B Predator
Drone, which is 27 feet long, weighs 1,130 pounds, has a range of 770
miles, and can carry two laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire missiles.73  The
size and limitations of the police drone are, of course, by design, but it
should be clear that an armed police drone is very different from the
types of drones being used for counter-terrorism operations in
Afghanistan.
Given their prominence as part of American foreign policy, it
might be surprising to learn that armed drones are a relatively new phe-
nomenon.  The first known use of an armed drone occurred in Novem-
ber 2001, when a Predator drone fired a Hellfire missile to kill
Mohammad Atef, an al-Qaeda leader in Afghanistan.74  Since 2001, the
commitment to the development and use of weaponized drones by the
American military “has significantly increased.”75  The total number of
U.S. drone systems went from fifty in 2001 to more than 8,000 by
2013.76  Law enforcement agencies have been slow to adopt the tech-
nology, partly because of expense, and as of 2012 only seventeen law
enforcement agencies had asked for FAA approval to operate drones.77
Still, if the armed drone program in North Dakota is successful, then
law enforcement agencies will likely begin to adopt it in greater
numbers.
It is important to recognize a potential political problem with the
propagation of armed drones among law enforcement communities.
While this Note focuses on armed drones, the vast majority of scholar-
ship and public attention on drones has focused on their surveillance
capabilities.78  Legal scholars have pointed out that the government’s
use of drones for observation purposes could run afoul of the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Kyllo v. United States,79 and have raised concerns about
the more sinister Orwellian scenario of drones hovering outside of peo-
71. Vanguard Defense Industries ShadowHawk, UAVGLOBAL, http://www.uavglobal.
com/shadowhawk/ (last updated 2016).
72. This is largely because few jurisdictions permit law enforcement to use armed
drones.See Eric Brumfield, Comment, Armed Drones for Law Enforcement: Why It Might Be
Time to Re-Examine the Current Use of Force Standard, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 543, 547–49
(2014).
73. MQ-1B Predator, U.S. AIR FORCE (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/
FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx.
74. DRONES AND THE FUTURE OF ARMED CONFLICT: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND STRATEGIC
IMPLICATIONS 2 (David Cortright et al. eds., 2015).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 2011-2012 FAA List of Drone License Applicants, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
https://www.eff.org/document/2012-faa-list-drone-applicants.
78. Brumfield, supra note 72, at 547.
79. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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ple’s windows.80  Hillary B. Farber articulated the concerns on police
drone use this way:
Drones can provide police with the details of a person’s daily rou-
tine, easily allowing them to create a profile of the person’s
associations, religious affiliation, health conditions, professional
and recreational activities, and family and economic status.  When
all this information concerning hundreds, if not thousands, of
people can be gathered from a distance of thousands of feet in the
sky, it is hard to resist the claim that society has succumbed to an
Orwellian vision far beyond George Orwell’s imagination.81
This scenario has evidently occurred to state legislators as well.  In 2013,
forty-three states considered over 130 bills or resolutions on the subject
of how drones ought to be regulated.82  Eight states have formally regu-
lated their use.83  The question then emerges that if surveillance drones
are in trouble, would not armed drones be doubly so?  Or, put another
way, even supposing that the concept of a drone armed with non-lethal
force was palatable, wouldn’t the mere fact that it carries a camera
cause it to run afoul of constitutional protections?
There is an important distinction between armed drones, when put
to that purpose, and purely surveillance drones.  The picture that Far-
ber paints in her article is one of an ever-present drone that has the
capability of observing many people at the same time.  I do not doubt
that such a drone exists or that a drone like the ShadowHawk could be
repurposed for such a mission.84  An armed drone, though, is useful
purely as crowd control or in responding to an emergency that might
otherwise place a police officer in harm’s way.85  It might be helpful to
characterize the drone as working in an offensive or a defensive capac-
ity.  An offensive capacity is when the drone actively seeks out criminal
activity.  A drone acting in a defensive capacity merely responds to the
pre-existing presence of criminal activity.  Critics of drone surveillance
focus on the offensive capacity of drones to seek out and acquire infor-
mation on citizens.86  Although armed drones would inevitably survey a
broad number of citizens if, for instance, they are employed for crowd
control purposes, they are not performing any kind of investigatory
function.  An armed drone, therefore, does not represent the same
kind of Fourth Amendment activity that Farber and others worry about.
Drones armed with non-lethal munitions would not be able to operate
effectively at a “distance of thousands of feet,” and, even if they could,
80. See Brian Stern & Matthias Rubekeil, Coming Home to Roost—Domestic Use of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 62 DEC R.I. B.J. 5, 7–8 (2013).
81. Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to Domes-
tic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 6 (2014).
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id.
84. Nor, in fact, do I doubt that this scenario would be tempting to state and fed-
eral law enforcement. As Farber points out, the National Security Agency’s ability and
willingness to obtain the phone records of millions of Americans shows that abuse of
technology by the government is, at the very least, possible. See Id. at 6–7.
85. See Brumfield, supra note 72, at 556.
86. See Farber, supra note 77, at 6.
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their deterrent value rests in people knowing that they are present.
Additionally, armed drones, when deployed for defensive purposes,
would only be concerned with threats.  The daily routines of an individ-
ual would be unimportant to an armed drone operator.  The surveil-
lance function of an armed drone would be akin to a stationary
surveillance camera, not a mobile spy plane of the sort envisioned by
Farber.  As a result, objections to surveillance drones should not auto-
matically apply to armed drones.
IV. DRONES AND POLICE MILITARIZATION
Having identified the problems and existence of police militariza-
tion, and explained the nature and capabilities of armed drones for
police purposes, the next issue is assessing what kind of impact, if any,
the latter might have on curbing the former.  As stated earlier, the
effects of police militarization increase the instances and degree of
aggressive confrontation between police and civilians.87  This, in turn,
fuels the perception that police officers need to gain access to increas-
ingly modern, military equipment in order to protect their safety and to
discourage civilians who might resist.88  There are a number of ways to
combat this problem, ranging from more training for police officers to
discontinuing the 1033 Program.  I believe, however, that the best way
to eliminate both confrontations, which, in 2015 alone, resulted in
almost one thousand fatal shootings by police officers89 and riots across
the country,90 and the subsequent police militarization that follows, is
to reduce the risk of armed confrontation in the first place.  Drones
represent one way, and perhaps the best way, of reducing these armed
confrontations.
Understanding the reasons why requires understanding law
enforcement’s use of force guidelines.  In Tennessee v. Garner, the
Supreme Court first examined the use of deadly force by a police
officer within the context of the Fourth Amendment.91  The Court held
that the “use of deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently
unarmed suspected felon” was unconstitutional.92  In Garner, a police
officer responding to a break-in shot and killed Garner as he sought to
flee over a fence.93  The officer claimed he shot Garner because he was
“[c]onvinced that if Garner made it over the fence he would elude cap-
ture . . . .”94  At the time, Tennessee law provided that, “if, after notice
87. See Peak, supra note 40, at 205.
88. See Brown,supra note 19, at 670. See alsoKiker,supra note 22, at 298.
89. Investigation: People Shot and Killed by Police This Year, supra note 15.
90. See Ed Payne & Ralph Ellis, Marchers Supporting Baltimore Protests Take to the Streets
Across U.S., CNN (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/29/us/nationwide-fred-
die-gray-protests/.  Following the death of Freddie Gray, protestors took to the streets in
Washington D.C., New York, Minneapolis, Boston, Houston and Denver. Although the
protests were largely peaceful, protestors and police clashed in Denver, resulting in nine
arrests.
91. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id.
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of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist,
the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.”95  In
striking down this law as unconstitutional under the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Court said, “[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the
officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent
escape by using deadly force.”96  Thus, after Garner, the only justifica-
tion for using deadly force was to prevent the suspect from seriously
harming either the officer or another member of the public.
In a later case, Scott v. Harris, the Court clarified when an officer
may use deadly force.97  In Scott, a police officer attempted to stop a
fleeing suspect using a “Precision Intervention Technique,” which, in
theory, forces the fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop.98  While attempting
to execute the maneuver though, the police officer bumped the car,
causing the suspect to lose control, run down an embankment, and
then overturn his car.99  The suspect was left a quadriplegic as a result
of the injuries he sustained in the accident.100  Looking at the facts
through the lens of Garner, the Supreme Court stated, “Garner did not
establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions when-
ever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.’”101  Rather, Garner
“was simply an application of the Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonable-
ness’ test to the use of a particular type of force in a particular
situation.”102
Turning to the question of whether the police officer’s use of force
was “reasonable,” the Court stated that the two relevant inquiries were
the “number of lives at risk” and the “relative culpability” of those
lives.103  So, although there was a smaller risk of injury to the public
than there was to the suspect (if the police officer undertook the
maneuver), the use of force was nonetheless reasonable because of the
suspect’s culpability in creating the dangerous situation.  Additionally,
the Court held that just because the presence of police officers made
the situation more dangerous, they were not obligated to call off the
chase.  The Court said, whereas the officer’s ramming of the suspect
“was certain to eliminate the risk that respondent posed to the public,
ceasing pursuit was not . . . we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the
police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so reck-
lessly that they put other people’s lives in danger.”104
95. Id.(citing Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982)).
96. Id. at 11.
97. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
98. Id..
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 382.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 384.
104. Id. at 385. Interestingly and worryingly, the Scott opinion here appears to pri-
oritize making an arrest over concerns for public safety. Police officers are expected to
catch the evildoer even if, in doing so, they resort to actions far outside the initial harm
(the chase at issue in Scott began when a police officer clocked the suspect’s vehicle travel-
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Both Garnerand Scott stand for the proposition that a police officer
may only use deadly force when there is a risk of serious bodily harm,
either to the officer or to a third party. Scott further refined Garner in
saying that deadly force was not limited to those scenarios, but instead
could be applied when its use was “reasonable.”  Unfortunately, police
officers in the United States opt to use deadly force with regularity.105
They overwhelmingly use deadly force not to protect a third party, but
instead to protect their own lives.  There is, of course, nothing wrong
with using force for this purpose, but determining when a police officer
was reasonable in fearing for his or her life is a very difficult determina-
tion to make.106  Police militarization has only increased the risk pre-
sent in law enforcement and civilian encounters and, as I have stated
before, contributes to a “loop” whereby officers behave aggressively, the
community responds with increased hostility, and the officers then
need more protection and exhibit more aggression.  Ending this loop
requires, at least in part and to the extent possible, the withdrawal of
police officers from situations in which they might fear for their lives.
Armed drones are one solution to this problem.  Although drones
will never be substitutes for police officers, and police officers, by the
very nature of their profession, can never be entirely out of harm’s
way,107 armed drones can help reduce the risk posed to police
officers,108 particularly in high profile settings when the risk of confron-
tation between officers and civilians is high.  By reducing the number of
confrontations between police officers and civilians, drones reduce the
number of instances during which a police officer could reasonably fear
for his or her life.  A suspect cannot pose a threat of serious bodily
injury to a drone operator and thus there is no reason that the drone
operator would need to resort to deadly force under Garner.109  After
ling 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone and attempted to pull him over. Id. at
374). This is analogous to the type of thinking that has caused police officers to become
more militarized and less concerned with community policing. When the primary goal of
police work becomes apprehending criminals, and when military tactics and equipment
are used to serve that goal, it is little wonder that police militarization continues largely
unabated. I point out the dicta in Scott to show that even Supreme Court Justices are not
immune to the temptation of seeing police officers as frontline troops.
105. See generally WASH. POST, supra note 15.
106. Indeed, this is often the central point of contention between protestors and
law enforcement after a fatal shooting. It is precisely what triggered the riots in Ferguson,
MO and, although not involving a law enforcement officer, the mass outrage surrounding
Trayvon Martin’s death at the hands of George Zimmerman in 2012.
107. While much of this Note is devoted to the dangers to civilians during police
encounters, the dangers posed to law enforcement are hardly trivial. According to the
Officer Down Memorial Page, 130 police officers died in the line of duty in 2015 alone.
See Honoring Officers Killed in 2015, OFFICER DOWN MEMORIAL PAGE, https://www.odmp.org
/search/year/2015.
108. See Buck Sexton, Aerial ‘Shadowhawk’ Police Drones Can Now Deploy Tasers & Tear
Gas, THE BLAZE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2012/03/12/want-to-
see-the-aerial-drone-police-could-soon-deploy-in-your-town/. Randy McDaniel, the Chief
Deputy of the Montgomery County, Texas Sherriff’s Office (the same office that would
lose a drone in Lake Conroe, supra note 65) opined that the new ShadowHawk drone’s
non-lethal munitions “could save lives”.
109. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
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all, a suspect could not struggle with a drone flying or hovering in the
air and certainly could not reach for the drone’s non-existent gun.  The
vague “reasonableness” inquiry in Garner and Scott could be largely
done away with in situations involving drones because the situation
could not escalate beyond the initial confrontation and application of
non-lethal force.  This, in turn, would reduce the heated arguments in
the social, political, and judicial spheres over whether a police officer
was justified in fearing for his or her life.
Perhaps most importantly within the context of this Note, armed
drones, and their ability to keep police officers out of harm’s way, could
reduce the advance of police militarization.  The drones could theoreti-
cally break the self-reinforcing loop of militarization because officers
would no longer need to stand motionless and somehow passionless as
thousands of people screamed and hurled objects at them.  They would
not need to send in a SWAT team armed with assault rifles and an
MRAP to a residence to apprehend a suspect.  The drastic changes in
culture and execution, themselves the results of “mission creep,”110
would become increasingly dated and unnecessary as drones armed
with less than lethal force replaced them in dangerous scenarios like
riots and armed standoffs.  Although there may be occasions where spe-
cially trained and equipped law enforcement would be necessary, their
deployment could be dramatically scaled back.  This scale back, in turn,
would reduce both the perception and actuality of police militarization.
In From Mayberry to Ferguson: The Militarization of American Policing Equip-
ment, Culture, and Mission, Cadman Kiker concludes his article by saying,
“No longer can we allow the overarching concept of ‘officer safety’ to
degrade justice and democracy.  Rather, the paragon of a safe police
officer is one that is protected by the community itself, not at war with
it.”111  By protecting police officers through armed drones and not mili-
tary fatigues and grenade launchers, and by reducing the instances of
police confrontation with civilians, Kiker’s vision of a less violent, more
integrated society could become a reality.
In Armed Drones for Law Enforcement: Why it Might be Time to Re-
Examine the Current Use of Force Standard, Eric Brumfield analyzes the
impact that armed drones might have on use of force standards, and
proposes what he sees as a model set of rules.112  The rules he outlines
are (1) that a drone operator must always follow FAA regulations, (2)
that an officer must alert a supervisor when an armed drone has been
deployed, (3) unless unreasonable, the supervisor must approve every
request by an officer at the scene to use the armed drone against a
suspect, (4) the officer at the scene should request the use of force in
line with the Graham use of force policies, and (5) the drone operator
may not use the drone to apply force on an individual unless he is
either at the scene or directed to do so by another officer at the
110. Kealy, supra note 8, at 432.
111. Kiker, supra note 21, at 298.
112. Brumfield, supra note 72, at 544-46, 569–70.
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scene.113  While these guidelines might be best practices, the require-
ment that a police officer be present at the scene (Rule 5) defeats the
biggest advantage of deploying armed drones, namely, keeping officers
out of harm’s way.
The reason that Brumfield gives for requiring that a drone opera-
tor act only at the direction of a police officer on the scene is that the
“question remains whether a court will expand the ‘on the scene’ rea-
sonableness definition in [use of force] analysis to include specific
instances where an officer can perceive just enough from the drone
camera to qualify as ‘on the scene’ under the existing standard.”114  His
analysis, then, is that, as a legal matter, an officer might need to be
physically present.  If true from a legal perspective, then the premise of
using armed drones in certain inherently dangerous situations to pro-
tect police officers hits something of a roadblock.  Yet, Brumfield mis-
understands the law that he applies.  The use of force standard as
explained in Graham, which is the authority that Brumfield cites, is that
“[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force” will be judged from
“the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.”115  Here, the
Court is talking about the actions of a hypothetical, objective law
enforcement officer who, upon surveying the scene, decides whether or
not to use force. It is not saying that a police officer needs to actually be
on the scene.  Put another way, it is the standard by which use of force
will be judged, regardless of whether the use of force was actually
applied by an officer on the scene.  Adopting Brumfield’s reading of
Graham would be to eviscerate the test of its objectivity.
Instead of Brumfield’s overly cautious and, I believe, legally unwar-
ranted fifth rule, I would substitute two new rules, which deal with the
technical side of armed drones.  The first is that drones must, at all
times, be under the control of a law enforcement officer.  By “control” I
do not mean to suggest I have some great concern that a drone will
somehow “go rogue” and barrel into people or property.  Rather, the
rule is there to head off the inevitability of autonomous drones, which
go much further than simply letting a police officer be present in a
dangerous situation without, herself, being in danger.116  The second
rule is that armed drones must also be equipped with functioning com-
munication equipment before they are deployed.  By “functioning com-
munication equipment,” I mean some sort of loudspeaker that allows
the officer controlling the drone to speak with civilians as well as a
method for them to communicate back.  In the absence of this equip-
ment, a “fleeing” suspect might not know that he is fleeing at all.  Addi-
113. Id. at 570.
114. Id. at 571.
115. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). .
116. At the Consumer Electronic Show in January, 2016, a company called EHang
showed off an autonomous drone that could transport a passenger from one place to
another. See David Pierce, That Crazy People-Carrying Drone is About to Start Testing, WIRED
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/01/ehang-self-flying-drone-is-totally-crazy/.
Although a far cry from an armed drone being able to assess, on its own, a dangerous
target, the future of advanced, autonomous drones is very quickly approaching.
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tionally, the loudspeaker acts as an ex ante deterrent because evildoers
are on notice of the drone’s presence and the officers can give a warn-
ing before resorting to any use of force.  These additional, common-
sense rules would allow officers to operate armed drones in a responsi-
ble manner and give civilians the opportunity to respond to suspicions
of wrongdoing and to comply with orders.
But these rules do not alleviate all of the concerns regarding
armed drone use, particularly when it comes to concerns over police
militarization.  In fact, some articles cite the use of drones by law
enforcement as evidence of increasing police militarization.117  It is easy
to see from where these concerns stem.  Drones are, in some ways, the
face of America’s War on Terror.118  The success of these drones is
interspersed with their failure; as missiles inevitably go wayward, their
victims are not limited to terrorists.  This, combined with their seeming
otherness, may explain why Americans are resistant to the idea of
police-operated armed drones.119  As I explained in Section IV, how-
ever, the drones that would be used by law enforcement are very differ-
ent from those used by the American military.  Drones like the
ShadowHawk are a far cry from the Predator drones operated by the
Air Force, and their weaponry, limited as it is to less-than-lethal force,
would not be capable of the faceless destruction that people around the
world see on the news.120
Nonetheless, there are still problems with the use of Predator
drones that could also apply to smaller law enforcement drones.  Schol-
ars have advanced two theories as to why armed drones are more dan-
gerous than piloted aircraft and why, as a result, their use should be
eliminated or, at least, heavily curtailed.  The first argument against the
use of drone weapons is that their availability increases the propensity
of political leaders to use force.121  The argument suggests that if
drones were not available, politicians would be more likely to opt for a
diplomatic solution rather than risk lives.  Applying this argument to
law enforcement does not fit perfectly, but it is conceivable that state
politicians, or even an elected law enforcement officer, would be more
willing to sign off on certain operations if it meant that police lives were
not in danger.  For instance, instead of attempting to negotiate the sur-
render of armed robbers, officials might instead opt to use armed
drones to attack the robbers.  Indeed, the robbers might even know
117. See Endebak, supra note 46, at 1490 (pointing out that, armed with post-9/11
federal funds, “local communities across all fifty states have been on a ‘gear-buying spree,’
purchasing everything from pilotless surveillance drones to ballistic helmets and bomb
robots”).
118. Jim Michaels, Drones: The Face of the War on Terror, USA TODAY (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/19/drones-pakistan-iraq/250339
55/ (claiming that drones have killed more than 500 suspected terrorist leaders, so they
may be more heavily linked with methods of assassination instead of protection among
Americans).
119. See Ekins, supra note 24 (indicating that 58% of Americans believe that drone
use by law enforcement would “[go] too far”).
120. See Vanguard Defense Industries ShadowHawk, supra note 71.
121. CORTRIGHT, supra note 74, at 9.
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that the drones would be on their way and so would fight any initial
resistance that much more aggressively.
Although any use of force by the state on its citizens is cause for
concern, it is important to consider the possible outcomes in this scena-
rio.  In the event that drones were not used, there would be two parties
using deadly force.  This increases the risk of confrontations and also
the risk that less culpable lives will be endangered.122  If drones were
deployed, then only one party would be using deadly force. It is possible
that, given time, the robbers would surrender, but it is not guaranteed.
It may be better, as a policy matter, to deploy armed drones to shock or
incapacitate the robbers even though a wholly non-violent solution
might be possible. Additionally, while the would-be robbers might be
motivated to fight recklessly in order to leave before the police drones
arrived, it is also possible that the drones would dissuade them from
committing the crime in the first place.123
The second argument advanced against the use of armed drones,
which is related to the first, is that drones lower the psychological barri-
ers to using force.124  As one scholar notes about the use of Predator
drones, “Drone systems partially remove the person from the emotional
equation of war, creating a vast physical and psychological distance
between the launching of a strike and its bloody impact.”125  Although
police drones could not create the kind of devastation the author
describes, the point is the same: namely, that a drone operator is more
likely to use force in a situation than an officer on the ground might be.
Proponents of this argument point out that psychology literature sug-
gests that it is difficult for humans to kill others at close range.126  They
argue that since drones effectively do away with the effects of proximity,
they “promote a change in perspective regarding the target of vio-
lence.”127  Viewed in this light, the use of armed drones would increase,
not limit, police militarization and violence.
This is a difficult objection to overcome, but the use of force guide-
lines combined with the inherent limitations of the armed drones
should alleviate concerns that a law enforcement officer will apply indis-
criminate force against civilians.  The use of force by a drone would still
be limited to those scenarios where the force is “reasonable.”128  A
police officer operating a drone could not indiscriminately attack civil-
ians without any repercussions.  Unlike a foreign war zone, the officer is
beholden to the community in which he serves.  Additionally, there is
an important distinction between the use of lethal and non-lethal force.
The decision to kill is different from the decision to incapacitate, and
the consequences are far less permanent.  Finally, the nature of police
122. Scott, 550 U.S.at 384.
123. Think of a canine unit checking luggage at an airport to not only prevent, but
discourage drug trafficking.
124. CORTRIGHT, supra note 74, at 9.
125. Id. at 10.
126. Id. at 43.
127. Id.
128. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). .
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drones armed with non-lethal weapons means that they cannot operate
very far from their target.  In order to be effective, they must be close to
the ground, giving an officer a good view of what is going on.  There is,
of course, always the potential for abuse, but “drones, as objects, are not
inherently good or bad, nor are they fixed and determinate.  Rather,
the capacities, purposes, and dispositions of drones depend on the
human network within which they are embedded.”129  The focus, there-
fore, should not be on banning drones, but, after recognizing and
appreciating their capabilities, ensuring that they are used responsibly
and for the purpose of increasing safety.
V. CONCLUSION
The repercussions of law enforcement’s march towards militariza-
tion are visible to anyone who takes the time to look for them.  This
militarization has real repercussions on the way police look and
behave,130 and raises tensions between the officers and civilians.131
Tensions can lead to deadly confrontations, particularly when the
police officer believes that his or her life is in danger.132  Drones armed
with non-lethal munitions offer the ability to halt militarization of
police by decreasing the need for law enforcement officers to be pre-
sent in inherently dangerous circumstances.  As a result, both law
enforcement and the public should embrace armed drones.
Unfortunately, this has not happened.  While law enforcement
agencies have expressed interest in armed drones, only one state, North
Dakota, has permitted their use by statute.133  The widespread adoption
of armed drones is likely held back for two reasons.  The first reason is
that there has not been an adequate distinction in the minds of the
public or politicians between a surveillance drone and a drone armed
with non-lethal munitions.  Instead, statutes passed by states limiting a
law enforcement agency’s ability to use drones simply lump all drones
into one category.134  But a drone used for surveillance purposes raises
privacy issues that are not necessarily raised by an armed drone.135
These privacy issues are what the vast majority of commentators have
focused on, much to the detriment of armed drones.  To combat this,
there must be better efforts by drone manufacturers and law enforce-
ment agencies to educate legislators and the public on the enormous
129. CORTRIGHT,supra note 74, at 24.
130. Brown, supra note 19, at 652-53.
131. Id. at 670.
132. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
133. See generally Wagner, supra note 23.
134. See Virginia Poised to Become First State to Adopt Legislation Limiting the Use of
Drones, ACLU (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/news/virginia-house-delegates-and-
senate-approve-two-year-moratorium-drones?redirect=criminal-law-reform/virginia-house-
delegates-and-senate-approve-two-year-moratorium-drones (discussing the Virginia
approach, which calls for a two-year moratorium on the use of all unmanned aerial vehi-
cles by law enforcement). See also Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, FLA.
STAT. §934.50 (2013) (outlining the Florida approach, which prohibits law enforcement
agencies from using “a drone to gather evidence or other information”).
135. See discussion in Section IV.
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benefits of armed drones and what their role actually entails.  This cam-
paign must focus on armed drones as tools for crowd control or hostage
situations and emphasize that, far from enabling police militarization,
they are actually there to curb it.  A successful media campaign might
frame the drones the same way as the campaign for body cameras.  The
drones are not there as a new tool in the police officer’s arsenal, rather
they are examples of new technology that are there to de-escalate tense
situations.
Additionally, an emphasis must be placed on the types of scenarios
in which the drones will be employed.  They are not cameras into
homes, or spies in the sky.  Armed drones are a response to police mili-
tarization in the United States and are deployed in those scenarios that
would otherwise call for an armed response by law enforcement.  Con-
veying this to legislators and highlighting these points will hopefully
convince some legislators of the wisdom in, at the least, the establish-
ment of pilot programs.  These pilot programs would then help combat
the second problem currently facing armed drones.
The second reason that drones have not attained widespread sup-
port is that they are still perceived as faceless weapons of war.136  This is
the inevitable result of fifteen years of an armed conflict in which pow-
erful and seemingly ubiquitous drones have targeted and killed count-
less terrorist leaders.137  But, while Predator drones are armed drones,
not all armed drones are Predator drones.  An armed police drone will,
and ought to, look and behave very differently from a Predator
drone.138  Pilot programs should be established so that a community
can grow accustomed to seeing drones accompany police forces.  Simi-
lar to other outreach programs, police officers should be encouraged to
interact with the community and show it what the drones look like and
how they work.  Armed police drones are built for their purpose, and
their purpose is to ensure the safety of police officers and, by extension,
the safety of civilians.  Those interested in lobbying for law enforcement
use of police drones have to dispel the image that fifteen years of war
on terrorism have created.  This is obviously a difficult task, but it need
not be an impossible one.  Demonstrations via a pilot program could
show the capabilities of armed drones and how they work.  Additionally,
with the pilot programs in place, it will not take long for shooting
deaths to decline.  This alone ought to be enough to convince some,
especially those in minority communities hit hard by police violence, of
the efficacy of armed drones and their life-saving capabilities.  Once it
becomes clear that armed police drones exist to save lives, and not to
extinguish them, society’s concerns over their use should abate.
I personally believe that armed drones will one day become a part
of the police officer’s arsenal.  My hope is that they are a part designed
to ensure that officers are kept out of harm’s way, and not as a weapon
of surveillance and violence to be visited upon the unsuspecting.  New
136. See generally Michaels, supra note 118.
137. Id.
138. See discussion in Section IV.
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technology has a unique opportunity to change society for the better,
but it can also be easily abused.  By following the rules outlined in this
Note, and by halting and reversing the trend of police militarization,
armed drones can help make America safer and less fractured.
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